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Who gets what and why? Committee assignments in 
the German Bundestag
Tim A. Mickler
Faculty of political sciences, leiden university, leiden, the netherlands
ABSTRACT
Although committee assignments have been researched in various parliaments, 
findings are inconclusive. This article contributes to the debate by analysing 
the allocations to specialised committees in the Bundestag, a legislature that 
establishes strong committees despite having strong parliamentary party groups. 
Studying assignments in this legislature can, therefore, help us to solve the present 
disjunction between ‘European’ and ‘American’ experiences regarding committee 
research. The study uses the congressional theories of legislative organisation as 
heuristic devices but explicitly highlights the strong involvement of parliamentary 
party groups. The hypotheses are tested with a multiple membership multilevel 
model across several legislative periods (1990‒2013) and backed up with 
evidence from 51 interviews with German legislators. The results show that 
next to constituency demands and the influence of regional factions, there is 
strong evidence for a reassignment pattern and that a legislator’s occupational 
background and connections to interest groups matter in the assignment process.
KEYWORDS legislative organisation; congressional theories; committee assignments; Bundestag
Modern legislatures are organised by a set of rules which allocate rights to indi-
vidual legislators or constrain them. They cover a broad set of themes (agenda 
setting, passing of legislation) and regulate the allocation of offices by establish-
ing intra-parliamentary institutions (Müller and Sieberer 2014). The two main 
intra-parliamentary institutions are parliamentary party groups (see Heidar 
and Koole 2000: 249) and parliamentary committees. Parliamentary party 
groups (PPGs) are heavily involved in running the legislature by setting the 
agenda, building majority coalitions, and processing legislation. Additionally, 
all parliaments ‘work to a greater extent or lesser extent through committees’ 
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(Laundy 1989: 96). These sub-groups of legislators are the prime organisational 
structures for preparing plenary sessions and documents. Together with PPGs, 
committees are ‘the most important component of legislative organization and 
preference aggregation’ (Saalfeld and Strøm 2014: 372) within legislatures.
Strong committees and strong PPGs were traditionally seen as mutually 
exclusive. When parties are strong and cohesive, active committees are ‘unnec-
essary’ and threaten to undermine the dominance of government and party 
leaders (Longley and Davidson 1998). Consequently, strong PPGs create weak 
committees (Rahman 2008; Shaw 1979). This led to two distinctive research 
‘traditions’: for legislatures, in which the central role of parties is not as promi-
nent, a large body of relevant committee research is available, most notably the 
US Congress and US state legislatures (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Hamm et al. 
2011; Kanthak 2009; Overby and Kazee 2000), but also the European Parliament 
(McElroy 2006; Whitaker 2005; Yordanova 2009). When, as in most European 
countries, partisan structures within the legislature have a profound effect on 
parliamentary organisation and procedures (Alemán 2015) the workings of 
committees were, traditionally, put in second place. Research on legislatures 
with strong PPGs usually suggested that committees are agents of the majority 
coalition (Kim and Loewenberg 2005). Similarly, Damgaard (1995) argues that 
PPGs and committees are the two crucial organisational structures in parlia-
ments, but the former clearly dominate the latter.
However, some legislatures have strong PPGs and strong committees. An 
example of such a legislature is the German Bundestag. This coexistence was 
long considered a ‘puzzling anomaly’ (Kim and Loewenberg 2005: 1105). Yet 
this offers the possibility to study the working procedures of strong commit-
tees in parliaments with strong PPGs and can help us to solve the disjunction 
between ‘European’ and ‘American’ experiences. An important issue to study 
in this regard is the committee assignment process. Committees are privileged 
institutions which subdivide policy areas. Their members are able to work on 
issues within the committee’s jurisdiction before other legislators can. Having 
the ‘wrong’ legislator on a committee, therefore, risks producing outcomes 
with detrimental effects for the larger PPG. Following this, the main research 
question is: what criteria play a role in the assignment process to committees in 
the Bundestag?
This research extends into a growing number of case studies on various 
national legislatures (Ciftci et al. 2008; Fujimura 2012; Hansen 2010, 2011; 
Mickler 2017a; Raymond and Holt 2014). Additionally, it contributes to the dis-
cussion of committee assignments in the Bundestag, for which existing studies 
have presented two opposing arguments. Some scholars argue that committee 
assignments in the Bundestag are affected by electoral rules or candidate selec-
tion procedures (Gschwend and Zittel 2016; Stratmann and Baur 2002), while 
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the results presented by Mickler (2013) indicate that assignments are structured 
by legislators’ prior occupation/education and affiliation to interest groups, with 
an additional influence of regional factions. The results from Mickler (2013) 
are, however, only based on the assignment of one legislative period (17th 
Bundestag) which makes it possible that outliers in this legislative period led 
to overestimation of the patterns. This study extends the period of investigation 
to multiple legislative periods (12th‒18th Bundestag) and differs in the statisti-
cal model used for the analysis by applying a multiple membership multilevel 
model, a model well suited to analyse the complex assignment process.
The committee system of the Bundestag
For the preparation of its plenary sessions the Bundestag relies on a number 
of permanent ‘standing’ committees (Ständige Ausschüsse).1 The number of 
committees has varied considerably in the past (1st Bundestag: 40 commit-
tees, 6th Bundestag: 17 committees). Since the 1960s, each federal ministry 
receives a committee as its parliamentary counterpart. Additional committees 
are established to divide the workload of existing committees or to underline 
the societal relevance of an issue, e.g. the Sports Committee (established since 
1969) and the Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid Committee (established 
in 1998). Table 1 shows the established specialised ‘standing’ committees at 
the beginning of the 18th legislative period. Committees in the Bundestag are 
considered strong (Strøm 1998) and they have extensive rights to take up an 
issue on their own initiative (Selbstbefassungsrecht) and play a central role in 
the policy-making process. Draft legislation is submitted, after first reading, to 
one or more committees. After considering the legislation, the lead committee 
(federführender Ausschuss) usually submits a recommendation for a resolution 
(Beschlussempfehlung) which summarises the discussions in the committee. The 
plenum relies heavily on this recommendation for its final votes.
Preferences for committee membership are evaluated by PPGs via direct 
talks or by surveys. These preferences serve as a baseline for further negotiations 
to draw up the final allocation of members to committees. The final distribution 
needs to be passed formally with a vote in the PPG meeting (Fraktionssitzung), 
where a legislator can also initiate a crucial vote. Although this possibility 
exists, it is very rare.
Theories to analyse committee assignments: a congressional bias
The question arises of what factors play a role in the assignment process. 
Given that committee research was long characterised by a ‘Washington bias ‒ 
which deems Congress, and Congress alone, as the only legislature worthy of 
study’ (Nelson 1974: 120), theories on committees are also mainly restricted 
to those developed to study the US Congress (commonly labelled distributive, 
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informational and partisan theories). These theories are the first that research-
ers turn to: ‘Analyzing non-US legislative bodies without drawing extensively 
on the literature of the US Congress is nearly impossible’ (Hansen 2011: 348).
The distributive theory of legislative organisation (Shepsle 1978) views leg-
islatures as decentralised institutions. Legislators are primarily motivated to 
secure their own re-election and are dominated by geographical concerns. To 
accomplish their re-election, legislators seek to distribute particularistic benefits 
to their constituents. The distributive theory argues that committees facilitate 
this by dividing policy areas and allowing legislators who have a ‘stake’ in the 
committee’s jurisdiction to join them. The composition of committees is pre-
dicted to be unrepresentative of their parent body (Krehbiel 1990: 149) ‒ e.g. 
committees dealing with agriculture will attract legislators from rural districts.
The informational theory of legislative organisation views committees as 
agents of the chamber to increase the efficiency of the legislative process. It high-
lights the uncertainty that legislators face about the consequences of policies 
Table 1.  specialised committees established at the beginning of the 18th Bundestag 
(2013–).
note: this overview excludes the General committee (German: Hauptausschuss) which was established at 
the beginning of the legislative period. it is not a specialised committee and due to its short existence it 




affairs of the european union – 34 / 34
Budget – 41 / 41
cultural and Media affairs – 18 / 18
Defence Defence 32 / 32
Digital agenda – 16 / 16
economic cooperation and Devel-
opment
economic cooperation and Devel-
opment
21 / 21
economic affairs and energy economic affairs and energy 46 / 46
education, research and technolo-
gy assessment
education and research 34 / 34
environment, nature conservation, 
Building, nuclear safet
environment, nature conserva-
tion, Building, nuclear safet
36 / 36
Family affairs, senior citizens, 
Women and Youth
Family affairs, senior citizens, 
Women and Youth
36 / 36
Finance Finance 37 / 37
Food and agriculture Food and agriculture 34 / 34
Foreign affairs Federal Foreign office 37 / 37
Health Health 37 / 37
Human rights and Humanitarian 
aid
Federal Foreign office / economic 
cooperation and Development
16 / 16
internal affairs interior 37 / 37
labour and social affairs labour and social affairs 41 / 41
legal affairs and consumer 
protection
Justice and consumer protection 39 / 39
petitions – 26 /26
sports interior 18 / 18
transport and Digital infrastructure transport and Digital infrastruc-
ture
41 / 41
tourism – 18 / 18
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and argues that committees are means to reduce this uncertainty by allowing 
legislators to specialise. Through committees, a legislature can obtain superior 
information about the outcomes of bills and exploit the talents of its elected 
members (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990: 533).
Both of these theories view PPGs in the legislature as weak and non-con-
straining. The partisan theory of legislative organisation (Cox and McCubbins 
1993) contradicts this and views committees as the agents of the majority PPG 
leadership. PPGs are assumed to watch the assignments carefully and decide 
whether they are contradictory to their seat-maximising strategy. Committee 
assignments are part of the reward system of the PPG and loyalty to the leader-
ship is seen as a substantive determinant of the process. Especially committees 
that have an effect on the national perception of the party committees ‘will 
tend to have contingents that are microcosms of their party caucus’ (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993: 199).
Adapting the theories: parliamentary party groups as main actors
Although the congressional theories were originally developed against the 
backdrop of a particular legislature, their predictions are not specific to the 
United States. Rather than only testing the partisan theory (which places PPGs 
centrally), we can also apply the main organisational implications by the infor-
mational and distributive theory. However, certain adjustments need to be made 
when transferring them. Most fundamentally, this requires a redefinition of the 
role of PPGs as important actors with regard to committee assignments (see 
Fernandes 2016; Hansen 2016 for similar arguments). In a European context, 
‘no one would seriously consider any alternative to political parties as the most 
important political coordination mechanism’ (Müller 2000: 316). PPGs in these 
legislatures are characterised as being ‘powerful floor coalitions, capable of dis-
ciplining their members and passing their programs, ... effectively dominating 
the legislative agenda and taking responsibility for the final legislative product’ 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993: 5). Yet by relaxing the (congressional) assumption 
of the weakness of PPGs of the distributive/informational theory, both present 
perfectly feasible strategies that strong PPGs can pursue, i.e. use of the commit-
tee system to cater to external interests to increase the re-election chances of 
PPG members (distributive rationale) or to deal with the legislative workload 
by assigning policy specialists to committees (informational rationale).
Deducing hypotheses on committee assignments: who gets what and 
why?
The distributive rationale of committee assignments highlights the elec-
toral connection of legislators and argues that individual legislators rely on 
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committees to serve their electorate. This means that those members of a PPG 
join committees which correspond to a ‘constituency demand’ of a legislator.
Hypothesis 1 Legislators are more likely to serve on committees that correspond 
to their electoral connection with constituencies.
An alternative to testing ‘outlying’ demands is using ties to interest groups as 
the drive to be assigned to a committee (see Yordanova 2009). Although these 
external interests are not involved in the election of a legislator, the general idea 
remains: connections to interest groups represent external interests and allow 
us to test whether legislators who have a ‘stake’ in a committees’ jurisdiction 
(via their interest group ties) seek particular assignments. With regard to both 
distributive variables one might ask why strong PPGs would allow legislators to 
cater to those interests? First, it is assumed that PPGs are aware of the possible 
negative consequences of this assignment logic but might value the benefits 
more highly than the risks. The links to interest groups can bring external 
expertise into the decision-making process, while catering to electoral demands 
suits the goals of PPGs. This is connected to a second issue. This analysis aims 
to explain committee assignments, not what legislators can actually do. Strong 
PPGs still maintain other possibilities to influence the behaviour of legislators 
in committees.
Hypothesis 2 Legislators are more likely to serve on committees whose jurisdiction 
corresponds to their external interests.
The informational theory highlights the importance of specialised, efficiency 
improving committees. It predicts that strong PPGs assign members who can 
specialise at low cost due to advantages in knowledge related to specific pol-
icy areas that committees are responsible for. PPGs consist of legislators with 
various backgrounds. Exploiting the special talents of these elected members 
minimises the risk of undesired outcomes for the PPG and is, therefore, a valid 
strategy for strong PPGs.
Hypothesis 3 Legislators are more likely to serve on committees in which they can 
specialise at low cost.
The partisan rationale highlights the proactive role of the PPG leadership 
to ‘structure’ the composition of committees. This ‘structuring hand’ will most 
likely be visible in committees whose policy area concerns an important issue 
domain of the party. By controlling the assignments, the PPG leadership seeks 
to secure desired policy outcomes. This reduces the risk of an electoral defeat 
at the next election. One factor that is hypothesised to be used in this process 
is the number of legislative periods. PPGs are expected to prefer experienced 
legislators on those committees which are important for the electoral success 
of a party, and prevent less experienced legislators from serving on them.
Hypothesis 4 An increase in the number of legislative periods has a positive effect 
on being assigned to committees whose jurisdiction concerns an important issue 
domain of the party.
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Similarly, another strategy of the PPG leadership is the assignment of legis-
lators who are more moderate in terms of their policy positions. Legislators who 
are more representative of the mean of the PPG are less likely to produce policy 
outcomes that are detrimental to the party and are, therefore, hypothesised to 
be disproportionally assigned to committees whose jurisdiction concerns an 
important issue domain of the PPG.
Hypothesis 5 Legislators who are more moderate in terms of their policy positions 
are more likely to serve on committees whose jurisdiction concerns an important 
issue domain of the party.
Research method
The analysis makes use of a mixed-method approach. First, committee assign-
ments are analysed by means of a statistical analysis. The initial results are cross-
checked with evidence from semi-structured interviews that were conducted 
with legislators in January 2015 (three interviews by telephone in February 
2015). A total of 51 legislators were interviewed.2 The interviews were par-
ticularly important to test the influence of a constituency demand (Hypothesis 
1) which I was unable to test in the statistical analysis. While scholars in the 
US were able to match clear district types to committees, such considerations 
were absent for some committees in the Bundestag (see e.g. the European 
Affairs Committee). Additionally, electoral districts are not a statistical unit in 
Germany. Therefore, one would have to rely on higher-level aggregated data 
and generalise over regions. The evidence of constituency characteristics is, 
therefore, solely addressed in the interviews with legislators.
Operationalisation of variables
The dependent variable measures the membership of specialised committees, 
i.e. those that exert both the control function and the scrutiny of bills of spe-
cific policy areas. The periods analysed comprise the 12th (1990–1994) to the 
18th Bundestag (2013–2017). Committee membership lists of all legislators of 
the 11th3 to 17th Bundestag (effective 16 March 2013) were obtained from the 
parliamentary archive in Berlin in April 2013.4 For the remainder of the 17th 
legislative period, the overview lists were updated by consulting the parlia-
mentary website twice a month. For the 18th legislative period, only the first 
assignments at the beginning of the legislative period are included (information 
based on the website of the Bundestag). The data is arranged as a person‒choice 
data matrix with n = number of legislators × number of committees, indicating 
for each legislator whether they were a member of the established special-
ised committees in the respective legislative period as a full member or not 
(dichotomous variable: 0 = no, 1 = yes). In a second variable, the membership 
status to committees as a substitute member (Stellvertreter/in) is measured 
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(0 = no, 1 = yes). Table 2 lists the assignments of legislators to committees per 
legislative period. As in most other legislatures, German legislators frequently 
serve on multiple committees.
Regarding advantages in knowledge, a legislators’ prior education and 
occupation are valuable assets to specialise at low cost in a given policy area. 
Information on the prior education and occupation of German legislators was 
obtained by coding legislators’ biographies from Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch 
Deutscher Bundestag (Holzapfel 1993, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2012, 2013). The 
data were coded according to the 2008 International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO-08) scheme, mostly by relying on the third level of coding 
(MINOR GROUPS) to account for small differences.5 Even though the scheme 
is designed for occupations, educational backgrounds easily fitted the coding 
schemes. The codes were then assigned to ‘fitting’ committees. The guiding 
principle was whether the prior education, and respectively the prior occupa-
tion, would give a legislator a relative advantage compared to a legislator who 
did not have such training (0 = not present, 1 = present for a committee). To 
illustrate, Legal Professionals (ISCO-08 code: 2610) were coded as having rele-
vant knowledge for the Legal Affairs Committee, Secondary Education Teachers 
(2330) for the Education Committee, etc. Some codes were assigned to multiple 
committees, i.e. occupations coded as Financial Professionals (2410) were seen 
as providing legislators with advantages in knowledge for committees dealing 
with Finance, the Budget and the Economy.
Affiliations to outside groups were measured by coding responsibili-
ties in enterprises and organisations (veröffentlichungspflichtige Angaben). 
The primary sources were remunerated activities during the exercise of the 
mandate (Entgeltliche Tätigkeiten neben dem Mandat), functions in corpo-
rations (Funktionen in Unternehmen) or in statutory bodies (Funktionen in 
Körperschaften und Anstalten des öffentlichen Rechts), or clubs, organisations 
and foundations (Funktionen in Vereinen, Verbänden und Stiftungen) (0 = not 
present, 1 = present for a committee). Simple membership of an organisation 








tors assigned to 
committees
Number assign-





12th (1990–1994) 24 632 913 962
13th (1994–1998) 21 636 802 855
14th (1998–2002) 22 654 847 965
15th (2002–2005) 20 576 699 732
16th (2002–2005) 21 581 725 786
17th (2005–2009) 21 597 774 829
18th (2013–May 
2015)
22 597 802 822
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does not qualify. The data is available online from 2005 onwards on the 
Bundestag’s website and in the Bundestag’s web archive (Bundestag 2015). For 
earlier legislative periods, the respective print editions of the official registers 
(Amtliches Handbuch Deutscher Bundestag) were used (Bundestag 1994, 1998, 
2002).
To measure parliamentary seniority, the number of legislative periods was 
obtained from Kürschner’s Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag.
The additional partisan hypothesis on legislators’ loyalty demands more 
fine-grained data on individual legislators’ policy positions relative to the par-
liamentary party group mean. Because several problems prevent the analysis 
of roll-call votes and the usage of survey data,6 this study relies on the content 
analysis of legislators’ plenary speeches to infer these positions.7 For the anal-
ysis, all speeches given during the legislative period were used (see Table 3). 
Questions are excluded from the analysis. Even though Martin (2011) points 
out that the analysis of parliamentary questions allows for a better understand-
ing of individual legislators’ preferences, political parties have strong control 
over parliamentary questions. In the German case, Saalfeld (2000) argues that, 
although questions are non-legislative tools at the disposal of legislators, legis-
lators have to obtain the party’s green light to ask them.
To analyse the data, the Wordscores technique (Laver et al. 2003) is used. 
Wordscores was chosen because it has been successfully applied to speeches for 
estimating legislators’ policy positions (Bernauer and Bräuninger 2009; Laver 
and Benoit 2002) but it also suits the research goal conceptually. Wordscores 
compares text patterns in two sets of texts (called ‘reference’ and ‘virgin’ texts). 
These ‘reference’ documents serve as ‘anchor points’ for the estimation of the 
other legislators. For this study, speeches from each legislator are compared 
with the speeches of PPG leaders (Fraktionsvorsitzende). PPG leaders usu-
ally deliver a large number of speeches and can speak on a range of topics. 
Using their speeches as references is also appropriate because they are, unlike 
e.g. manifestos, the ‘same text genre’.8 The basic idea is that legislators who 
are more moderate in terms of their policy positions use similar text patterns 
to their leaders. Respective PPG leaders were identified based on Kürschner’s 
Table 3. number of analysed plenary documents and speeches.
source: own dataset. With regard to 18th legislative period which was still ‘on-going’ during the research, 
the end point was the 107th plenary session at the end of May 2015.
Country Plenary sessions No analysed speeches
12th (1990–1994) 244 26,256
13th (1994–1998) 248 27,052
14th (1998–2002) 253 26,087
15th (2002–2005) 186 18,175
16th (2002–2005) 233 29,306
17th (2005–2009) 253 34,801
18th (2013–May 2015) 107 11,719
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Volkshandbuch Deutscher Bundestag. The reference files were scored according 
to the party position estimates of the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens 
et al. 2014).9 The final value for each legislator is the difference between their 
calculated Wordscores estimate and their PPG’s mean. This approach made a 
calculation possible for almost all legislators.10 There are some limitations to 
this approach. Wordscores treats ‘any text as a simple bag of words’ (Scharkow 
2013: 763), thus making no assumptions about syntax. It should also be clear 
that political parties delegate power to legislators to speak in the parliament 
(Proksch and Slapin 2014). However, it is assumed that more subtle deviations 
are possible in speeches due to their longer nature. One might generally ques-
tion whether it is possible to infer policy positions from word choices. While 
such considerations cannot be ruled out entirely, earlier studies have shown 
that the approach can successfully extract underlying dimensions. Additionally, 
the approach used in this study accounts for this as much as possible by using 
leadership speeches and interpreting the obtained Wordscores estimates purely 
as a measurement of (dis)similarity. Before running the analysis, a validity test 
was carried out to test whether legislators on the same committees have more 
similar word frequencies than legislators from the same PPG. If so, committee 
membership would trump PPG membership, which would be highly problem-
atic for the analysis. However, this is not the case. Across all PPGs, legislators 
from one PPG are more closely associated with each other than the committee 
members.
In this study, a committee’s importance for a PPG is ranked based on the 
salience of the issues that a committee deals with for the PPG. This resonates 
most strongly with the re-election goal assumed by the partisan rationale of 
committee assignments. To operationalise this, I rely on the approach of Bäck et 
al. (2011). Their approach, originally developed to measure ministerial portfolio 
salience, is based on the extent to which parties emphasise themes in electoral 
manifestos. Similar to the original analysis, I apply the proposed ‘maximalist’ 
scheme (for a more extensive discussion, see Bäck et al. 2011: 452ff) to con-
nect themes in manifestos to the policy remit of committees using the data of 
the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). The specific attachment of CMP 
categories to committees is listed in Appendix 1 (online). The different nature 
of committees made some adaptations necessary as not every committee has a 
clear corresponding coding scheme in the CMP data (e.g. Tourism, Petitions, 
or Post and Telecommunication). These committees were ranked as having 
low issue salience. This judgement is based on the self-reported assessment 
of legislators during the interviews. The Budget Committee was scored as the 
most important committee.11
Additionally, committee experience was added as a control variable. Earlier 
studies pointed to the existence of a pattern of a continuation of committee 
membership (see Mickler 2013). Legislators were coded as having committee 
experience if they served on the same committee in the immediately previous 
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legislative period.12 Aggregating committee memberships across multiple leg-
islative periods would mean an inflation of positive codes. When committees 
were merged, legislators of both committees were coded to have committee 
experience for the new committee. Similarly, legislators who served on com-
mittees that were split up were coded to have experience for both of the new 
committees.
Interpreting the models: assignments to committees in the 
Bundestag
The data were analysed by fitting a multiple membership multilevel model. 
These models are an extension to the standard multilevel framework and allow 
for lower-level units (here: legislators) to belong to more than one higher-level 
unit (committees) (Browne et al. 2001). These models are best suited for the data 
characteristics.13 The mixed-membership multilevel models were estimated 
in R using the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2015).14 For each legislative period 
four models were estimated: full members without (model 1) and including 
committee experience (model 2), and substitute members without (model 3) 
and including committee experience (model 4).15 Figure 1 depicts the coeffi-
cients and confidence intervals of the models excluding committee experience 
(upper row) and including committee experience (lower row) for full members 
and substitute members. Separate lines are used to distinguish the respective 
effects for each legislative period. The detailed model summaries are shown in 
Appendix 2 (online).
The strongest effect across all legislative periods refers to committee experi-
ence (models 2 and 4), suggesting that legislators are likely to continue on the 
same committee once they are assigned to it. In order to give an estimate of how 
much it actually ‘matters’ in terms of an increasing likelihood to be assigned to 
a committee, predicted probabilities were calculated.16 The predicted probabil-
ity of being assigned to a committee as a full member with current committee 
experience is, on average across the 12th and 18th Bundestag, 53.58%. This is 
a very high value given the complexity of the assignment process and the fact 
that around one-third to one-quarter of legislators in each legislative period 
were freshmen. Similarly high values were also reported by Mickler (2013), thus 
indicating that the 17th legislative period is not an outlier. Substitute members 
switch more frequently across legislative periods: the predicted probability of 
being assigned as a substitute member to a committee with current committee 
experience is, on average across all analysed legislative periods, 23.92%.
The interviews underline this finding. Legislators argued that it is difficult 
to push someone out of a committee who has served on it and would like 
to continue (e.g. Interview Bundestag 150929B, 152901D, 150130B, 150129F, 
150119A). If a legislator did a good job, to the general satisfaction of the PPG 
and the leadership (Interview Bundestag 150119A), then that legislator had 
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a ‘first option to buy (Vorkaufsrecht)’ (Interview Bundestag 150112A). The 
adherence to such a procedure certainly makes sense. The very specific and 
technical content of policy areas takes time to get used to. Legislators estimated 
that it takes between one year (Interview Bundestag 150126A) and two years 
Figure 1. coefficients and confidence intervals of multiple-membership multilevel model 
of committee assignments in the Bundestag 12th to 18th legislative period.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  529
(Interview Bundestag 150112A, 150130A) to get acquainted with the nuts and 
bolts of a topic, with a minimum of half a year to be ‘able to speak up and say 
something meaningful’ (Interview Bundestag 150114H).
The effect of ‘advantages in knowledge’ of legislators
The model summaries of the 12th to 18th Bundestag show a clear positive con-
nection between a legislator’s prior education/occupation and the assignment 
to corresponding committees across all legislative periods (almost continuously 
passing the p < 0.001 threshold) as full members. Committees in the Bundestag 
are disproportionally filled with legislators who have advantages of knowledge 
in the committee’s policy area (see also Mickler 2013). This overall picture is 
also encountered in the assignment patterns of substitute members (see right-
hand plots in Figure 1). On average, the predicted probability in the 12th to 
18th legislative period of being assigned to a committee as a full member with 
a corresponding relevant prior occupation is 5.51%, holding all other variables 
constant at their means (model 1). When committee experience is included 
(model 2) this value is reduced to 3.27%. The predicted probabilities of being 
assigned to a committee with a corresponding prior education in the jurisdic-
tion of the committee is lower (2.67% for full members in model 1 and 1.58% 
in model 2, similar values for substitute members). Although seemingly small, 
these values must be seen in the context of a very complex assignment process.
Respondents from all PPGs confirmed this connection. In certain areas 
prior knowledge is almost a necessity (legal affairs, finance, tax issues and, 
moderately, health), although legislators were able to name exceptions. Note 
that familiarity with a topic can also stem from other areas, e.g. legislatures at 
the level of federal states (Interview Bundestag 150114B, 150113B, 150130E). 
In some instances the PPG leadership seems to follow this logic to find a fitting 
committee. An interviewed German legislator, who was unable to get their 
preferred committee spot, explained:
And then [the PPG leadership] looked at my biography and saw that I used to 
be a postman and then they said that would fit with the committee dealing with 
post and telecommunication. (Interview Bundestag 150128H)
Committee membership and external interests
Across all legislative periods there is a highly significant effect of external inter-
ests with regard to full members (left-hand plots in Figure 1) and substitute 
members (right-hand plots). The predicted probabilities of the effect of external 
interests is even higher than the effect of ’ occupational background (model 1: 
average predicted probability across all analysed legislative periods is 8.07% 
compared to 5.51% of occupational background; model 2: 4.24% of external 
interest compared to 3.27% of occupational background).
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The interviews confirmed that there is no strict rule prohibiting these assign-
ments (e.g. Interview Bundestag 150115C). Interviewed legislators were able 
to cite fitting examples, like the head of the general employee organisation 
(Gesamtbetriebsratsvorsitzender) of Frankfurt Airport and the Traffic Committee 
(Interview Bundestag 151401C), the president of the German Labour Union 
and the Social and Labour Affairs Committee (Interview Bundestag 151401E), 
or an operative of the Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians 
(kassenärztliche Vereinigung) and the Health Committee (Interview Bundestag 
150114I). However, when conflicts become problematic, cases are looked at 
individually (Interview Bundestag 150119A). An example frequently given was 
being connected to organisations which represent armament manufacturers 
and the Defence Committee (Interview Bundestag 150119A). During the inter-
views, a respondent also provided an interesting insight, suggesting that only 
those legislators ‘who are in the mainstream of the PPG’ will not have a problem 
(Interview Bundestag 150113B). Only legislators of the Green party indicated 
that they view such assignments with suspicion (Interview Bundestag 150114I).
District characteristics and ‘outlying’ committees
A second distributive variable refers to district characteristics. The mixed-mem-
ber proportional electoral system (nominal districts and party lists) allows 
for testing whether two ‘assignment logics’ exist.17 As mentioned above, I was 
unable to test this hypothesis in the statistical analysis. When asked whether 
the connection to electoral districts (Wahlkreise) plays a role in committee 
assignments, legislators generally answered in the affirmative (e.g. Interview 
Bundestag 150119A, 150119B, 150115D, 151901C). No legislator denied such 
a connection even if it was not applicable to them personally. Reasons given 
mostly concerned constituency characteristics (Interview Bundestag 150119A, 
150119B), e.g. the constituency being an important traffic junction and the 
Transport Committee (Interview Bundestag 150115D). Also the presence of 
particular institutions motivates some legislators to seek out particular com-
mittees, e.g. army barracks and the Defence Committee (Interview Bundestag 
150114E, also 150119B) or power plants and the committee dealing with energy 
policy (Interview Bundestag 150127A).
German legislators were, however, generally sceptical about the added value 
of committee work for their re-election chances (a central component of the dis-
tributive theory). Committee work was seen as ‘relatively irrelevant’ (Interview 
Bundestag 151201A) to the general voter. Within their districts, legislators 
need to have a universal view on matters which legislators described as being 
the ‘Eierlegende Wollmilchsau’ (literally: ‘egg laying, woollen, milk dispensing 
sow’, best translated as jack of all trades: Interview Bundestag 151201A; also 
mentioned in 151401A and 150130D). Still, legislators join committees which 
resonate with their districts’ characteristics because committees are the primary 
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  531
source of actual information on an issue and legislators expect many questions 
to be on topics close to the committee’s jurisdiction.
Evidence of a leadership-controlled composition of committees?
Generally speaking, the results indicate no significant effect of the distance 
of legislators’ policy positions to the PPG mean for the likelihood of being 
assigned to committees of high importance. Only in some legislative periods 
can a weakly significant effect be found. Furthermore, the negative coefficient 
of the interaction effect indicates that the further away a legislator’s policy posi-
tions are from the mean of the PPG, the more likely they are to be assigned to 
a committee of high importance,. This completely reverses the prediction and 
contradicts the existence of a ‘structuring’ hand. This was also backed up in the 
interviews. How little the PPG leadership intervenes in committee assignments 
was illustrated by a legislator who explained that, with regard to the legislator’s 
PPG, there are several committees which largely contain PPG members who 
are non-representative of the PPG mean and are ‘outliers’ with regard to their 
policy positions. This has ramifications for how the other members of the PPG 
view what is ‘going on’ in this committee:
For some committee delegations of my PPG, and that is especially applicable to 
the one I am in, which do not reflect the political majority in the PPG, the distrust 
[of the PPG] is greater. (Interview Bundestag 150130E)
When asked why such an outlying group of legislators was ‘allowed’ to clus-
ter in a committee, the legislator depicted the role of the leadership as largely 
absent:
Those legislators wanted in and the leadership did not argue about it. They could 
have said ‘we don’t want you and you to be in there but would ask him or her’. 
But they did not and because of that it is politically unbalanced, so to speak. 
(Interview Bundestag 150130E)
With regard to the number of legislative periods, several models indicate 
a significant effect for full member assignments. The assignment of substitute 
members cannot be linked to such partisan considerations. Conceptually, this is 
not surprising. If a PPG decides to intervene in committee assignments, doing 
so for full members is more logical. The interviews confirmed the presence of 
a certain hierarchical order. For freshmen it is sometimes difficult to get into 
crucial committees (e.g. Interviews Bundestag 150130B, 150212A, 150120A, 
150202A, 150119B). However, this is not a fixed rule. Rather, a ‘mixture’ is 
aimed for (Interview Bundestag 150128B; also 150129A). PPGs are wary of 
risking a knowledge gap in a committee once those legislators end their career. 
There is no evidence of ‘reserving’ seats for experienced legislators and no 
‘greasy pole’ that freshmen have to climb before ‘qualifying’ for more important 
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committees. The system can, therefore, best be described as self-selection with 
restrictions.
‘Beyond the theoretical framework’: country-specific influences
The interviews also aimed to find country-specific patterns. The interviews 
underlined the two informal rules already presented by Mickler (2013): first, it 
is seen as ‘bad style’ to join a committee if one has worked in the correspond-
ing ministry as minister or under-secretary of state. Former ministers would 
usually make a clean break and continue in a different policy area (Interview 
Bundestag 150130G). The second factor is the influence of the regional fac-
tions (Landesgruppen) within PPGs, especially in the larger PPGs (CDU/CSU, 
SPD) with regard to central committees (e.g. Interview Bundestag 150129B, 
150127B, 150128D, 152901C). Although there is ‘no automatism’ (Interview 
Bundestag 150127B), larger regional factions tend to have a substantial claim for 
a minimum representation on a committee. Somewhat peculiar is the process 
in the CDU/CSU, where the influence of the regional factions is highly insti-
tutionalised. CDU/CSU legislators communicate their wishes and preferences 
to the chairmen of their regional factions (Landesgruppensprecher). These sub-
sequently negotiate the allocation of committee seats to their members in the 
‘meeting of the chairmen of sociological groups and regional factions’ (Runde 
der Vorsitzenden der CDU/CSU Landesgruppen und soziologischen Gruppen), 
internally referred to as the ‘carpet dealer convention’ (Teppichhändlerrunde).
Within other PPGs, the role of the regional factions is less formalised but 
it nevertheless matters. Regional factions aim to make sure they have ‘a wide 
spread of legislators in possibly all committees’ (Interview Bundestag 150112A). 
Particularly within smaller regional factions, the chairmen of the regional fac-
tions coordinate assignment wishes among their members to prevent unnec-
essary clustering:
For the small regional faction of which I am a member, [...], it is clear that we 
talk about this so that we will not have four of us on the Defence Committee. 
(Interview Bundestag 150119B)
However, the process in all PPGs is mostly coordinated directly between 
whips and individual legislators, while in the CDU/CSU this process is effec-
tively delegated to the ‘carpet dealer convention’. The influence of the regional 
factions also trumps the other factors hitherto tested18 and is, therefore, located 
at a higher level:
There is no chance that the Budget Committee is stacked with people from Baden-
Wuerttemberg, even if they would be the greatest financial experts. The other 
regional factions will not allow this. (Interview Bundestag 150130G)
Additional mechanisms to prevent clustering exist in the smaller PPGs. 
Legislators from the Green Party pointed to the influence of political wings in 
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the assignment process (Interview Bundestag 150114I, 150129E, 150127A). The 
Left applies a double quota (East‒West and women‒men). However, while the 
women‒men quota is ‘set’, the East‒West quota is merely ‘striven for’ (Interview 
Bundestag 150126A, 150129A) as the application of both principles in small 
committees is numerically impossible.
Conclusion: congressional rationales with country-specific 
patterns
PPGs and committees are the two central components of legislative organisation 
and preference aggregation, promoting decisional efficiency in the chamber 
and allowing legislators to influence policy. Unfortunately, we do not fully 
understand how these two institutions interact and how strong PPGs organise 
their work in committees. A crucial issue in this regard is the assignment of 
legislators to committees. Committees subdivide policy areas and allow their 
members to work on issues before other legislators can. PPGs therefore need to 
consider carefully who is assigned to which committee to prevent committees 
producing outcomes with detrimental effects for the PPG.
This study addressed this issue by considering the assignment process in the 
German Bundestag, a legislature with strong PPGs and strong committees. For 
the analysis, the congressional theories of legislative organisation (distributive, 
informational and partisan theories) were used to disentangle several broad 
organisational rationales. Certain adaptations were made to account for the dif-
ferent institutional setting, most prominently the acknowledgement of PPGs as 
central gatekeepers in the process. The main findings are surprising. The ‘most 
obvious’ choice to capture the processes in the Bundestag would be the partisan 
rationale, which highlights the proactive role of the PPG leadership to explain 
the organisation of legislatures. However, partisan considerations were hardly 
influential in the analysis. More experienced legislators have slightly higher 
chances of being assigned to more electorally salient committees, but partisan 
‘stacking’ is limited. This is an important finding. The absence of a ‘tight’ grip 
of the PPG leadership on committee assignments in a legislature with strong 
PPGs is unexpected.
This study extends evidence presented in an earlier study of the Bundestag 
by Mickler (2013) over a longer time period. Once a legislator has been a mem-
ber of a committee, that legislator has a relatively strong claim to stay on the 
committee. Advantages in knowledge greatly increase the likelihood of being 
assigned to a corresponding committee. Many assignments can be linked to 
legislators’ external interests. The interviews pointed towards the importance 
of constituency characteristics, thus giving further evidence for the arguments 
regarding ‘localness’ (Gschwend and Zittel 2016). This is important evidence 
for a distributive rationale. However, the rationale has its limitations, as leg-
islators argued that their committee membership provides no ‘boost’ for the 
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next election. The interviews also highlighted additional informal rules such 
as the influence of the regional factions of the larger PPGs and, for smaller 
PPGs, self-imposed quotas (men and women, political wings or regional con-
siderations). Such country-specific patterns need to be included for a complete 
account of the assignment process.
The practice in the Bundestag with regard to external interests and com-
mittee assignments raises questions about the further implications of such a 
system. One might be tempted to interpret this result as ‘shady’, especially since 
the side functions and additional incomes of German legislators have been the 
subject of discussion in the media in the past (see e.g. Elmer and Hebel 2015). 
However, all that can be concluded from this analysis is that a significant share 
of the committee assignments of German legislators is connected to their side 
functions. Only if these legislators were able to work relatively autonomously 
might we be able to draw such conclusions. Future studies need to build on this 
research by analysing the relationship between committee members and the 
PPG and the room for manoeuvre available to individual committee members. 
These issues have not hitherto been widely studied.
Notes
1.  The Bundestag’s Standing Orders also allow for the establishment of further 
committees, i.e. study commissions (Enquete-Kommission) to prepare reports 
on wide-ranging matters, or additional housekeeping committees which are 
concerned with the smooth administration of the legislature.
2.  SPD: 17 legislators, CDU/CSU: 16 legislators, The Left: 10 legislators, B90/
Grüne: 8 legislators.
3.  Used for committee experience for non-freshmen in the 12th.
4.  These overviews contain detailed information on the start/end date of a 
legislator’s committee membership as a substitute/full member.
5.  For a few occupations it was necessary to make distinctions on the UNIT level 
(4 digits), e.g. with 2630 (Social and Religious Professionals) which comprises, 
among others, Economists (2631), Psychologists (2634) and Social Work 
and Counselling Professionals (2635). Economists qualify as having relevant 
knowledge for committees dealing with economics. Psychologists qualify for 
the health committee, the third group for committees dealing with social affairs. 
Clustering these occupations on the third coding level would mean losing 
essential information.
6.  Roll-call votes cannot be used because there is hardly any variation in the data 
due to high levels of parliamentary party group unity in voting. For surveys, the 
major issue is missing data due to typically low response rates and the need to 
keep all legislators in the analysis. Additionally, it would be almost impossible 
to gather data on past legislative periods.
7.  I explicitly refer to these as policy positions and do not discuss the results 
obtained in terms of ideology. This phrasing is more appropriate for how 
Wordscores estimates can actually be interpreted. It is unclear whether these 
actually measure ideology (see also a recent conference paper which compares 
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Wordscores estimates to the ‘gold standard’, i.e. the ideological self-placement 
of legislators in a survey, Mickler 2017b).
8.  Manifestos’ language is carefully considered and expresses parties’ views in an 
ideal world.
9.  The text corpus was prepared and analysed with the ‘quanteda’ package in R 
(Benoit et al. n.d.).
10.  Missing values for n = 91 legislators.
11.  The Budget Committee is ranked to be of highest importance because virtually 
every committee depends on it, hence its nickname ‘king’s committee’ 
(Königsausschuss).
12.  Scholars in the US are divided on whether a continuation of membership is 
evidence for the informational (greater specialisation) or the distributive theory 
(property rights norm).
13.  (1) All legislators are assigned to at least one committee; (2) some legislators 
are assigned to multiple committees; (3) committees differ with regard to their 
importance to parliamentary party groups.
14.  I would like to thank Michael Meffert and Zoltan Fazekas for their help with the 
analysis and interpretation of the models. All errors are the sole responsibility 
of the author.
15.  The model includes two random intercepts (individuals and committees) to 
account for the data structure. Two cross-level interactions of the partisan 
variables with committee importance per parliamentary party group (ranking 
from 1  =  lowest priority to n  =  number of committees established (highest 
priority)) are inserted. The main effects are not further discussed, but excluding 
them may lead to inferential errors. For a more detailed discussion on the 
consequences, see Brambor et al. (2005).
16.  This was done using the Zelig package in R (Imai et al. 2009).
17.  There is no ‘clear’ divide between those two groups. Nominally elected legislators 
have ‘no monopoly on constituency representation’ (Saalfeld 2005: 219) and 
candidates frequently run as dual candidates (see Zittel and Gschwend 2007).
18.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to test for this influence in the statistical model. 
The process described here implies that the assignment chances of a legislator 
decrease after another legislator from the same Bundesland is assigned to a 
committee. However, the model used in this study estimates the assignment 
likelihood for all legislators simultaneously.
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